The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has recently tested credit risk measurement models used by large international banks to measure the risk of their portfolios in order to measure the risk of default of its insured banks' deposits. Using both balance sheet and equity market data for a sample of 15 large Italian banks, this study applies some of these models to value both individual and portfolio default risks for a deposit insurance agency. The empirical analysis allows to estimate the loss probability distribution which in turn can be used to: (i) evaluate the capital adequacy of the deposit insurance agency; (ii) estimate the marginal contribution to the whole portfolio risk of a single insured bank; (iii) identify a formula for deposit insurance pricing, as an alternative to the one based on option pricing models. Such a formula, based on a value-at-risk framework enables a more accurate risk quantification.
Introduction
The evaluation of risks that might affect financial institutions has recently become a core topic widely discussed by both national and international supervisory authorities pursuing the objective of financial system stability through policy instruments such as riskweighted capital ratios, deposit insurance, and lending of last resort. More generally, banks are institutions subject to rigorous supervision and regulation aimed at avoiding that a system crisis might dramatically affect the general economic system. The effects concern money offer reduction (Friedman e Schwarz, 1963) and increase of credit intermediation cost (Bernanke, 1983 ) that might negatively affect the real economy (Gilbert et al., 1999) .
In so doing, banks all over the world are accurately and constantly supervised through both off-site monitoring systems, based on information drawn from balance sheets, and on-site systems use to analyse the organisational, informative and managerial adequacy of banks' risk management systems. In such a supervisory framework, the system of capital Banks are also subject to a safety net aimed at avoiding that single bank crisis episodes might generate systemic crisis undermining the financial system stability (Diamond e Dybvig, 1983) . In most of the economically advanced countries, such safety network is based on the lender of last resort function carried out by the central bank, limited to liquidity crises, and on the system of deposit insurance.
The US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), has recently started to investigate credit risk measurement models used by major international banks in order to test whether these models can be applied to quantify the risk of its portfolio of insured banks (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2000) .
The present study focuses on both individual and portfolio risk measurement of the Italian listed banks. The empirical analysis, based on publicly available information, is based on both balance sheet and equity market data of a sample of 15 large Italian banks listed at Milan Stock Exchange. Section 2 provides a short review and description of the literature on credit risk models and shows how such models can be used by deposit insurance agencies to measure the risk of default of their portfolios of insured deposits.
Section 3 reports the methodology applied for the empirical analysis. A detailed description of the model inputs is provided by separately analysing the estimation of an individual bank default probability and the risk evaluation of the whole portfolio. Section 4 highlights the main empirical results and shows how such results can be used both for the definition of the deposit insurance fund adequacy and for deposit insurance pricing. Finally, section 5 reports the main conclusions and discusses possible future research areas.
Credit risk models
Credit risk measurement models can be gathered in two main categories: 1) Default Mode (DM) and 2) Mark-to-Market (MTM) models. In the former credit risk is identified with the counterpart default risk. Therefore, two possible events are considered: default and survival. The latter rather holds all possible changes of the counterpart's creditworthiness, technically called "credit migrations". The two approaches basically differ for the quantity of information necessary to feed them: limited in the case of default mode models, much wider in the case of mark-to-market ones. The main output of a credit risk model is the density function of credit loss probability of the portfolio (probability density function -PDF). From the analysis of such loss distribution, a financial institution can estimate both the expected and unexpected loss of its credit portfolio. The expected loss equals the distribution average; it represents the bank expected loss for its portfolio within a specific period of time (usually 1 year). Unexpected loss rather represents the average "deviation" from expected loss and measures the actual portfolio risk. This can in turn be measured as the standard deviation of the density function probability. Such measure is relevant only in the case of a normal distribution and is therefore hardly useful for credit risk: indeed, the distribution of credit losses is usually highly asymmetrical and fat-tailed. This actually implies that the probability of large losses (extreme) is higher than the one that would be associated with a normal distribution.
The main features of credit risk models applied by major international banks are reported in technical documents. Two such documents, referred to CreditMetrics (Gupton & others, 1997) and CreditRisk+ models (Wilde, 1997) , are publicly available. Starting from the analysis of such technical documents, academic research has focused on two main issues. The first one concerns the model-related difference, both from a theoretical and empirical point of view. As for the former, a distinction is made (Frey e McNeil, 2001) between latent variable models, such as CreditMetrics™ and KMV Portfolio Manager™ , and mixture models, such as CreditRisk+™ and CreditPortfolioView™. In the first group, a counterpart's default depends on prevailing unobserved variables (latent): common risk factors "governing" latent variables give rise to interdependent defaults. In the second group, according to the values of common economic factors, a counterpart' s default is rather conditionally independent.
In spite of this formal distinction, various authors found remarkable similarities among such models. Gordy (2000) carried out a comparative analysis of the CreditMetrics™ and CreditRisk+™ models: apart from some differences in the assumptions concerning the loss distribution function, the two approaches present similar methodological structures. The simulations revealed similar results if applied to average loan portfolios, besides being particularly receptive to default correlation coefficients and to the assumptions on the distributions of systematic risk factors. Koylouglu and Hickman (1998) compared the CreditMetrics™ , CreditRisk+™ and CreditPortfolioView™ approaches: their related methods appeared theoretically equivalent. According to these authors, the differentiating factor is the very method of measurement of the correlation rate of the various portfolio exposures (correlation among default events, or default correlation, versus correlation among return on asset, or asset correlation). Other authors, among whom Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2000) , Phelan and Alexander (1999) , further detailed the aforesaid models with no emphasis on the analysis of the common features of concern.
Financial institutions apply credit risk models to evaluate the "economic capital" necessary to face the risk implied by their credit portfolios. In such a framework, provisions for credit losses should cover expected losses 1 , while economic capital is seen as a cushion for unexpected losses. Similarly, the logic behind this approach can be applied to the credit exposure that deposit insurance agencies implicitly face. Expected losses represent the reserve necessary to back up such losses within a specific period of time (for example, one year). In the same way, the fund adequacy of a deposit insurance agency can be evaluated on the basis of the portfolio unexpected losses. Credit risk models could also be used to determine deposit insurance pricing as an alternative to the classic approaches based on option pricing.
Credit portfolio loss empirical distributions are usually asymmetrical towards high loss values: the probability to incur into extreme losses is higher than that implied in a normal distribution. A deposit insurance agency is therefore obliged to back up a similar situation: within a certain period of time, a relatively high probability of limited losses due to the default of small banks, counterbalanced by a low probability of large losses in case of default of one or more large banks. As the distribution is asymmetrical, the precise evaluation of the distribution extreme quantiles is a fundamental factor. Estimation mistakes might lead to greatly miscalculate the loss corresponding to the desired confidence level.
The measurement of default risk of deposit insurance agencies stand up for bank defaults is therefore similar to bank risk management evaluations of loan portfolios. The method is basically the same, though with different initial inputs for the model: while for a bank exposures are represented by loans, for a deposit insurance agency the total amount of the insured deposits represents its credit exposure. Further, we can obtain portfolio risk measures by combining every single exposure to identify the cumulative loss distribution.
Every bank indeed has a low default probability that might turn into losses for the deposit insurance agency. Theoretically, the deposit insurance agency stands up for remarkable risks of limited losses being though exposed (to a very low extent) to high losses due to the default of one or more big banks.
While a similarity between the two risk profiles does exist, the two types of default events are quite different. A loan default is actually the credit borrower inability to afford targeted payments. Even though the borrower default might lead to the bank default, credit risk is not the only crisis threatening banks as it usually depends on a combination of risks:
credit, market and operating risks.
We should also further distinguish between credit borrower and bank defaults, being the latter a regular event: only supervisory authorities have the power to "close down" a bank. From such a point of view, a technically defaulted bank might keep on acting thanks to the intervention of the supervisory authority if bail-out policies such as too big to fail ones are adopted.
Lack of data makes it difficult to evaluate the parameters of credit risk models 2 .
Only a few banks have such wide and detailed historical series related to the default rates of their credit portfolios, as corporate default is quite a rare event. Such a problem is much more emphasised in case of bank default: the limited number of default events makes critical any statistical approach to risk measurement. A really uncommon exception is the large number of bank crisis occurred in the US system at the beginning of the '90 during the Savings and Loans crisis. In general, some approaches, such as KMV' s, use the American system data to evaluate the default historical frequencies of banks with different risk rates.
In the Italian banking system, the lack of data definitely prevents the comparison with the historical frequency of the outputs resulting from the application of the à-la Merton model.
We therefore had to evaluate bank default probabilities (expected default frequency -EDF) based on theoretical rather than empirical probabilities.
Research methodology
This paragraph shows an approach to evaluate the loss distribution of a deposit insurance agency. Such distribution is useful to identify the appropriate level of resources necessary to face the potential losses coming from future bank crisis and to define a pricing system for risk-based deposit insurance. The deposit insurance agency can be compared to a bank measuring its counterparts' default risk. While for banks counterparts are borrowers, for deposit insurance agencies they are rather the same banks, with exposures equal to the insured deposits. We here describe the risk evaluation method applied to both single banks and to portfolio risks.
Evaluation of the default probability of single listed banks
Restricting the empirical analysis to listed banks we can apply an approach similar to the CreditMonitor model of KMV, to evaluate individual default probabilities (Crosbie, 1999) . The evaluation of individual default probability depends on both market (stock prices) and accounting information (balance sheets data). This approach uses the theoretical relation between the market value of corporate assets and their related default probability 3 . It is based on two theoretical relations: (i) the value of equity capital can be considered equal to the value of a call option on the corporate asset value, and (ii) the link between the (observed) volatility of equity capital return and the (unobserved) volatility of corporate asset return. The estimate of the default probability implies three phases: (1) evaluation of the corporate asset value and related volatility, (2) calculation of the distance to default, equal to the number of standard deviations from the default point, (3) weighting the distance-to-default within its related default probability. Asset market value and related volatility come from an option pricing model. Following the evaluation of the asset market value, the CreditMonitor approach evaluates whether such asset value is higher or lower than the default point. The default point, i.e. the asset value under which liabilities 4 exceed assets bearing the company to default, is equal to the total amount of short term liabilities plus half that of long term liabilities. The distance-to-default measures the number of standard deviations of the corporate asset from the default point. Finally, the distance-todefault is turned into default probability on the basis of empirical evidence of default rates per classes of distance to default.
Portfolio approach to evaluate expected loss and marginal risk
In a default-mode model, where only default and survival events are considered, the portfolio expected loss (EL P ) is equal to the total amount of the product of the single exposures to each one of the n banks (EXP i ), the default probabilities (EDF i ) of each bank, and the losses in case of default (LGD i ).
(1)
The unexpected loss evaluation implies two phases: in the first one we calculate the unexpected loss, related to every single portfolio exposure (ULi), equal to the loss standard deviation. Assuming LGD as a fix variable (e.g., equal to 50%), we obtain the following formula: In this way, the marginal unexpected loss of exposure i is the result of the partial derivative of the portfolio unexpected loss compared to the unexpected loss of the same exposure. As Ong (1999) proved, performing this partial derivative we obtain the following "closed" formula to calculate the marginal unexpected loss of every single exposure:
The contribution to the risk of the deposit insurance agency portfolio given by the ith bank does not actually depend on its expected loss, rather on its "unexpected" loss. In particular, the contribution to portfolio risk of the i-th bank, ULC i , is function of two variables: 1) the unexpected loss of the i-nth bank, that, on its turn, is function of the default probability of the single bank and of the exposure towards the same bank; 2) the correlation rate of such loss with the rest of the portfolio. As it will be shown, the contribution to portfolio risk is a fundamental parameter to define a pricing system for a risk-based deposit insurance (see paragraph 3.4).
The empirical distribution generation of bank portfolio losses
The "mean-variance" approach cannot be applied to define the whole distribution of the losses that might occur to a deposit insurance agency. The distribution of credit losses is indeed non-normal and this prevents the application of a simple multiplier to the portfolio standard deviation (UL P ) in order to get the rate of potential maximum loss (and consequently the portfolio VaR 6 ), at a certain confidence interval. For this reason, an alternative simulation technique, Monte Carlo, is applicable in order to generate the empirical distribution of losses and to get the analytical scenarios of losses related to different level of probability. This output also provides an empirical multiplier to be applied to the standard deviation (called capital multiplier), in order to use the "closed" formulas described in paragraph 3.2.
The simulation is run as follows: evaluation of the bank market asset value according to the KMV model already described, to get the complete correlation matrix of the portfolio listed bank assets. Such correlations are then used as parameters of a multivariate normal distribution. As in the case of the Merton model, we assume that: (i) a single bank goes into default when its asset value decreases under a certain "critical" rate,
(ii) the asset value of each single bank follows a normal distribution; (iii) the asset values of different banks follow a multivariate normal distribution.
We obtain some correlated random numbers 7 to be compared to the default threshold rate, equal to the standard normal reciprocal distribution of the default probability. In this way, if the correlated random number is higher than the default-point threshold, the bank does not come up against any crisis and gets a 0 value of the Bernoullian random variable; on the contrary (i.e. the correlated random number < default threshold) the bank goes into default and gets a 1. For every bank that incur into default during the simulation, the model calculates the expected loss for the deposit agency (EL i ) as the product of the exposure (EXP i ) by the loss in case of default (LGD i ) 8 . Finally, all single expected losses must be summed up to get the expected loss for a specific simulation. By repeating the Monte Carlo simulation a certain number of times (in our case, 30.000) we get the empiric distribution of portfolio losses. This allows to calculate the loss rate for every possible confidence rate (percentile) and a multiplier to apply to the standard deviation already calculated (UL i ) to directly obtain the loss corresponding to the desired confidence interval. 
The Risk-based pricing model of deposit insurance
In the case of deposit insurance, the methodology described allows an immediate application to define the insurance value at risk rate that should be allocated to the joining banks. The value at risk rate should cover at least expected losses as the spread between interest earned rate applied to banks on the loans granted to their customers and the riskfree return rate totally covers the expected loss rate. The deposit insurance pricing based on the expected loss for the insurance agency has two main advantages. At the system level, establishing an insurance price for each bank equal to the expected loss allows the insurance premia to cover average losses over a relatively long period of time: in so doing the reserve is sufficient to guarantee future interventions. Moreover, this pricing system based on individual risk discourages the moral hazard phenomenon: the most risky banks are actually burdened with higher value at risk rates.
The expected loss-based pricing enables to monitor risks at the individual level though preventing the evaluation of the portfolio risk contribution of every single exposure.
Every bank exposure contribution to the portfolio unexpected losses (ULC P ) is a function of expected loss, correlation and exposure. Therefore, pricing should also take into account the contribution of each exposure to the unexpected (ULC). As for the deposit insurance fund, the pricing for a single bank is simply equal to the relative expected loss plus the contribution to unexpected losses multiplied by a market risk premium, estimated as the difference between market portfolio return (R M ) and the risk-free rate (R F ) 9 . Analytically 10 :
The empirical estimate of ULC can be of difficult computation, especially if carried out within a simulation frame. In this case, the calculation of the contribution of the i-nth exposure to the unexpected loss requires the comparison of the unexpected loss (at a certain confidence interval) calculated on all the portfolio expositions with the loss resulting from the removal of the i-nth exposure 11 . As an alternative, we can apply the "closed" formula previously described, In general, all major banks need a lower remuneration for expected losses but a higher one in case of unexpected losses, as they provide a high contribution to the loss volatility of the deposit insurance agency portfolio (or rather the supervisory authority).
An application to the Italian Listed Banks
This section shows an application of the proposed methodology to a sample of Italian listed banks. According to the CreditMonitor model applied by KMV, it is possible to evaluate the theoretical default probabilities of the banks applying both balance sheet and stock market data from the Milan Stock Exchange. Following this model, we obtain the correlation matrix between the asset returns of the banks (asset return correlation). The asset market values are on their turn evaluated on the basis of the à-laMerton model. Then, the correlation matrix between assets can provide the corresponding two main elements: the expected loss rate and the product of the amount of risk -a VaR estimate -and the price of riskroughly given by the difference between the cost of equity and the risk-free. rate. In the case of a mutual fund, such as the Italian Fondo Interbancario di Tutela dei Depositi -FITD, where every joining bank provides the funds necessary to reimburse the deposits of defaulted banks. Every single bank therefore assumes the risk related to the possible defaults of the other joining banks. Therefore they need to be remunerated on the basis of a market risk-based premium. 10 For complexity reasons we avoided any administrative aspects. 11 This method, called "leave-one-out", is quite complex in terms of computations. It actually requires a certain number of simulations corresponding to the number of the portfolio exposures.
correlation matrix between bank defaults (default correlation), using the relation between these two dimensions
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. Such information allows to:
1) obtain the empirical distribution of the portfolio losses and evaluate both expected and unexpected losses of the deposit insurance agency due to future defaults of the Italian listed banks;
2) fix the deposit insurance pricing, based on both the expected loss and the contribution to the portfolio risk of every single exposure;
3) define the adequacy of the fund for a deposit insurance agency.
Exposure at default risk and recovery rate
As shown in Table 1 , the banks included in the analysis are the 15 major Italian institutions in terms of total assets and represent more then 60% of the total assets of the Italian commercial banks. These banks are rated by one or more of the main international rating agencies (Moody's, Standard and Poor's, FitchIBCA). Table 2 reports the long term ratings. The exposure (EXP) of the deposit insurance agency (specifically for the Italian case, the Fondo Interbancario di Tutela dei Depositi -FITD) is represented by customers' deposits (mostly current account deposits). This value is a proxy of the amount of the deposits the insurance agency is to reimburse in case of a bank crisis
13
. The FITD exposure to the risk of default of these insured banks is adjusted in order to keep a constant recovery rate of 50%, obtaining the values reported in the last column of Table 1 .
12 For further details on this calculation method, see Zazzara (2002) . 13 Actually, the total amount of the refundable deposits is inferior to such amount as it refers to the deposits subject to protection up to a value amounting nearly to 103.000 euro per depositor. rating, meaning that, while presenting poor financial and economic conditions, they receive a relevant support from either the supervisory authority or the Government in case of crisis.
Evaluation of individual default probability
As already explained, the evaluation of the theoretical default probability was carried out according to the CreditMonitor model of KMV, that enables to obtain this dimension on the basis of both balance sheet data and share prices. In particular, being the equity value known (resulting from the product of the current share price multiplied by number of the outstanding shares) as well as its volatility (in the present case, the standard deviation of historical returns), it is possible to evaluate the market value of both corporate assets and the standard deviation of such variable (using the theory behind option evaluation models). 14 The FitchIBCA Individual rating is an evaluation of the creditworthiness of every bank apart from any guarantee or support that might come from third parties such as Governments or supervision authorities. Unlikely all other ratings reported in the table it is rather the evaluation of the financial-economic conditions of the issuing bank than of the actual default probability. The scale used by FitchIBCA for this rating includes five classes (A, B, C, D, E) plus four intermediate classes or notches (A/B, B/C, C/D, D/E). 15 At any rate, in some cases, the evaluation refers to a shorter period of time, depending on the Stock Exchange rating. We hold such aspect also for the following evaluation of the correlations coefficients. In order to define the Default Point, keeping up with the KMV model assumptions, we considered half of the short term liabilities plus the long term ones. We therefore assume that a single bank can survive, within the targeted period of time (1 year) even if the asset cannot cover the total liabilities. Table 4 Using both market value and equity volatility data we obtain both asset market value and asset volatility 16 . In order to Calculate the EDF of every single bank, the analysis has been based on data directly provided by KMV. This is because our results expressed in terms of the "distance to default" are then converted into EDFs based on the historical default frequency data of the subjects with a similar distance to default. In this case, the EDF here reported are purely theoretical as they are measured on empirical defaults of foreign banks and financial companies (especially American and Asian) 17 . 16 See Crosbie, 1999. 17 Basically, in Italy all "real" default (technically, required administrative liquidations) of merchant banks hardly ever occurs, it is rather inexistent. The actual default probability is therefore equal to zero next to any Distance-to-default level [equal to a: (Market asset -Default Point) / (Market asset * Market asset volatility)]. 
Portfolio risk and deposit insurance pricing
Once the evaluation of the risk variables on an individual basis has been defined, we analyse the portfolio risk. At the portfolio level, correlation becomes the key variable. The estimate of risk dimensions reported in paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3 requires the evaluation of two different correlations: default correlation and asset return correlation.
The default correlation coefficients feed the calculus driver of the portfolio unexpected loss (UL P ), while the asset return correlation coefficients are used to generate the empirical distribution of portfolio losses, obtained through a Monte Carlo simulation.
Having both equity and asset market values, evaluated according to the CreditMonitor approach of KMV 18 , we can estimate the asset return correlation matrix. The following show quite high correlations both between bank share price returns and between the latter and the market index, with coefficients ranging between a minimum of 8% and a maximum of 81%, with an average of 52% 20 . This is quite a normal trend for the share prices of companies belonging to the same industry. Table 6 -The "asset return correlations" matrix (March 1997 -March 2002 IBC UCT SIM BDR MPS BNL RLB BPC BPM BPV BPE BPN CRF CRE BTS MKT IBC 100% 72% 70% 61% 61% 53% 62% 47% 23% 57% 49% 58% 75% 61% 43% 75% UCT 72% 100% 77% 46% 66% 38% 63% 38% 21% 62% 50% 57% 80% 66% 43% 76% SIM 70% 77% 100% 62% 74% 41% 81% 45% 20% 49% 66% 53% 68% 52% 33% 77% BDR 61% 46% 62% 100% 65% 73% 75% 69% 20% 57% 71% 65% 59% 60% 23% 74% MPS 61% 66% 74% 65% 100% 61% 74% 48% 14% 48% 34% 69% 60% 56% 34% 63% BNL 53% 38% 41% 73% 61% 100% 45% 59% 25% 49% 48% 58% 47% 67% 20% 62% RLB 62% 63% 81% 75% 74% 45% 100% 53% 10% 50% 54% 64% 77% 61% 26% 84% BPC 47% 38% 45% 69% 48% 59% 53% 100% 25% 59% 50% 60% 52% 61% 41% 55% BPM 23% 21% 20% 20% 14% 25% 10% 25% 100% 30% 27% 23% 19% 34% 43% 22% BPV 57% 62% 49% 57% 48% 49% 50% 59% 30% 100% 64% 78% 76% 74% 36% 52% BPE 49% 50% 66% 71% 34% 48% 54% 50% 27% 64% 100% 49% 61% 49% 8% 58% BPN 58% 57% 53% 65% 69% 58% 64% 60% 23% 78% 49% 100% 73% 77% 42% 56% CRF 75% 80% 68% 59% 60% 47% 77% 52% 19% 76% 61% 73% 100% 78% 51% 76% CRE 61% 66% 52% 60% 56% 67% 61% 61% 34% 74% 49% 77% 78% 100% 41% 67% BTS 43% 43% 33% 23% 34% 20% 26% 41% 43% 36% 8% 42% 51% 41% 100% 38% MKT 75% 76% 77% 74% 63% 62% 84% 55% 22% 52% 58% 56% 76% 67% 38% 100% Source: Estimates based on Datastream data.
The corresponding default correlation matrix is reported in table 7. 18 The asset return correlation matrix is indirectly estimated using the equity market return correlations. 19 Such index is provided by Datastream and covers nearly all companies listed in the Italian market. 20 This value was calculated as the average between the correlation coefficients not included in the main diagonal. The correlation coefficients are in this case much lower than the asset returns ones, ranging from a minimum of 0% to a maximum value of 27%, with an average value of 8%.
The ratio between the average coefficients of asset return correlation and default correlation is nearly 7
21
.
Portfolio standard deviation evaluation
Using the default correlation coefficients we can estimate the portfolio standard deviation and obtain:
Applying the equations reported in paragraph 3.2, we can estimate the portfolio expected loss (EL P ), the standard deviation (UL i ) and the marginal unexpected loss assigned to every exposure (ULC i ). The sum of these marginal unexpected losses of the different exposures should equal the portfolio standard deviation previously defined. Table   8 briefly shows such evaluation outputs.
Therefore, if the exposure totals 172,136 ml euro, the expected loss amounts to 218 ml of euro (quite a small amount). This is equal to the sum of the expected losses of each exposure (corresponding to the product of the exposures by their respective EDFs 
Capital multiplier, VaR and deposit insurance pricing
Being the mean-variance approach, described in the previous paragraph, based on standard deviation data, is not enough to understand the asymmetrical nature of the portfolio loss distribution. We therefore apply a Monte Carlo simulation to outlay the alternative loss scenarios and related confidence levels. Applying the model reported in figure 1 and using the asset return correlation matrix reported in table 6, we obtain the results reported in table 9. A confidence interval of 99,50% gives rise to a maximum loss equal to 17,530 ml euro: subtracting the expected loss (218 ml) we obtain a portfolio VaR of 17,312 ml euro.
As already described, in order to avoid heavy calculations to measure the marginal unexpected loss of every single exposure (and its marginal VaR) used in the pricing formula of deposit insurance, we opt for the capital multiplier method rather than the "leave-one-out" 22 one. For this reason we estimate the multiplier to apply to the portfolio standard deviation (UL P ) in order to obtain the maximum loss associated to the desired confidence interval. The "empirical" multipliers are reported in table 10.
22 According to such method, the marginal VaR of a single exposure is evaluated as difference between the whole portfolio VaR and the portfolio VaR resulting excluding the analysed exposure. In case of numerous exposures, this method takes a long time to make all calculations. Applying these multipliers to the marginal unexpected losses (ULC i ) previously calculated, we obtain the "empirical" marginal unexpected losses. The pricing corresponds to the sum of the expected loss (EL) plus the product of the Marginal VaR of each exposure, equal to the difference between ULC i and EL i 23 , and a market risk premium, as provided by (7). The risk premium applied in the empirical analysis is equal to 5%.
Empirical results are reported in table 11. exposures give a greater contribution in terms of unexpected loss. As reported in the last column of Table 11 , the difference between an insurance premium exclusively based on expected losses (EL) and the one based on portfolio risk is higher for banks representing larger exposures.
Finally, comparing the estimated total risk-based premium for the 15 banks (1,083.72 ml euro) with the total amount of exposures (172,136 ml euro), we get the theoretical value of the deposit insurance agency intervention. This value is 0,63% of the total amount of exposures, and is included within the 0,4%-0,8% interval, as stated by the charter of FITD.
Conclusions
In Italy, as well as in some other European countries, the deposit insurance agency intervenes in case of bank default but has no supervisory power on the banks with insured deposits. This situation, that might be called "powerless responsibility", calls for the FITD to cover the losses due to the default of the insured banks, though it does not have any policy instrument to control banks' risk taking policies. In such a framework, the moral hazard problem is greatly emphasised. Due to the interbank nature of FITD, another issue arises, namely the free-riding one, meaning that shareholders of every joining bank would benefit from the adoption of aggressive policies of risk assumption, well-aware of the negative consequences for the other joining banks.
The agency has only one tool to insure deposits enabling to balance such problems and discouraging risk assumption of the joining banks: an effective insurance pricing based on the actual risk profile that every bank implies for the Fund. Following this logic, this study applied an approach similar to the one adopted by CreditVaR models to measure the risk faced by deposit insurance agencies. In particular, we used both the balance sheet and market share data referred to a sample including 15 big Italian listed banks. We could therefore estimate both default risks on an individual basis and portfolio risks for a deposit insurance agency that should reimburse the deposits of defaulted banks. The empirical analysis allowed the evaluation, using a Monte Carlo simulation, of the loss probability distribution. We also proved how the latter, on its turn, can be used to: (i) evaluate the adequacy of the financial resources of a deposit insurance agency, (ii) estimate the marginal contribution to the whole portfolio risk for a single bank, (iii) propose an alternative pricing formula of deposit insurance compared to the one based on option pricing models.
Our empirical results showed that the model produces reasonable results in compliance with the current practice of the FITD. While a total amount of insurance premium complying with the current engagement of the FITD has been obtained, results showed significant differences in the pricing of the insurance deposit protection for the different sample banks. Such differences reflect both differences in their individual risk profiles and the higher impact that the exposures to larger banks present on the risk profile of the portfolio.
